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The increasing financialization of America’s large public companies 
has profoundly affected labor markets.  Wages are stagnant, income 
inequality has grown, and corporate America is no longer a provider of 
stable employment for middle-class workers.  Common explanations 
include globalization, the rising power of the financial sector itself, the 
decline of trade union power, and skill-biased technical change.  However, 
changes in how corporations earn profits, and how they use those profits—
the two strands of behavior that I call corporate financialization—are key 
drivers of rising economic insecurity, and require further consideration. 
Rising corporate profits—driven in large part by increasing market 
concentration—have been disproportionately captured by the wealthy 
rather than reinvested in the firm.1  I define corporate financialization as 
the mechanism for such capture, specifically through the rise of two kinds 
of financial activities within firms.  First, corporate firms are holding a 
rising proportion of financial assets, and consequently, earn an increasing 
proportion of total profit from such assets, versus the profit that they earn 
from their normal business activity.2  Second, profits are increasingly used 
to drive up rising short-term share prices rather than to invest in labor or 
capital.3  These changes mean a higher proportion of corporate cash goes 
to shareholders and the purchasing of financial assets, leaving less for 
workers and productive investment.4  This leads to the economic puzzle 
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 1.   See Germán Gutiérrez & Thomas Philippon, Investment-less Growth: An Empirical 
Investigation 1–2, 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22897, 2017) [hereinafter 
Investment-less Growth]; J.W. MASON, DISGORGE THE CASH: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN 
CORPORATE BORROWING AND INVESTMENT 1–4 (Roosevelt Inst., 2015), rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
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FINANCE loc. 715–17 (2012) (ebook). 
 3.   See MASON, supra note 1, at 3, 5. 
 4.   See id. at 15.  
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we see today: record corporate profits and share prices coupled with low 
corporate investment and wage growth. 
Since firms are made up of different constituencies (e.g. employees, 
executives, and shareholders) and there are multiple ways for firms to use 
profits (e.g. investment, increased compensation, or shareholder 
payouts)—a rising proportion of profit flowing to one set of stakeholders 
or uses will result in a decline in what is available for the others.  The rise 
in firms’ savings and holding of financial assets has meant firms are net 
lenders rather than net borrowers in a macroeconomic sense, undermining 
the traditional notion that the financial sector exists to support corporate 
investment.5  The set of public policies that have incentivized financial 
asset-holding and increasing financial flows to shareholders must be taken 
on directly in order to improve the economic security of the American 
people. 
In this paper, I focus on financialization in the nonfinancial corporate 
(NFC) sector of the economy, which has received less attention than the 
dynamic of the rising financial sector.  First, I describe the current state of 
America’s public corporations and labor markets, and the legal and 
regulatory changes that drove shifts in corporate behavior.  Next, I 
examine the two corporate financialization flows: first, the rise of financial 
profits versus profits earned off of the sales of goods and services; second, 
the rise of short-termism6 and shareholder maximization.  In each section, 
I will review some of the literature that defines these phenomena and focus 
on research that demonstrates their impact on wages, employment, and the 
fissured workplace. 
Numerous researchers document the rise of financial profit-making 
within NFCs and examine its relationship with declining productive 
investment and declining labor market outcomes.  Others focus on the 
increase of capital market pressures and the ethos of shareholder value 
maximization.  Some researchers define corporate financialization as the 
rising ratio of financial profit earned off of financial assets relative to 
business profits earned from the regular trade of the corporation.7  Other 
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/06/Untamed-Final-5.10.17.pdf. 
 7.   See Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, Financialization and U.S. Income 
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researchers focus on the increase in unproductive stock repurchases and 
dividend payments as a primary measure of the rise of shareholder 
maximization as the modus operandi of firms.8  This paper combines the 
two lenses on corporate activity to follow the flows of profits into—and 
out of—the firm. 
“Financial assets” in the NFC context refers to the holdings of cash 
and short-term investments, current receivables, advances, and a 
miscellaneous category of “other” financial assets.  Financial asset 
holdings are not trivial: The Financial Times has documented how, in 
2015, NFC financial holdings topped $2 trillion for the first time, 
outstripping the asset holdings of traditional Wall Street asset managers.9  
Just thirty US companies have portfolios of cash, securities, and 
investments worth, together, more than $1.2 trillion; holdings of corporate 
debt and commercial paper have reached a record $432 billion, as 
companies, for tax reasons, have avoided repatriating cash and instead 
looked for riskier investment opportunities.10  The Financial Times noted 
that the fact that NFCs are “pumping excess cash into bonds reinforces the 
depressing fact that many companies don’t see attractive investment 
opportunities in their business lines, helping explain the lack of stronger 
economic activity and mediocre wage gains for workers in recent years.”11 
Before focusing solely on the process of financialization within NFCs, 
it is useful to define the term “financialization” as it pertains to the entire 
economy.12  The term is commonly used to describe the rising share of 
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profit accruing to the financial sector (as opposed to nonfinancial 
corporations) and the shift in the culture toward a market orientation.13  
Nell Abernathy and Mike Konczal define financialization as 
encompassing four core elements: savings, power, wealth, and society.14  
They further define it as “the growth of the financial sector, its increased 
power over the real economy, the explosion in the power of wealth, and 
the reduction of all of society to the realm of finance.”15  Gerald Epstein 
describes financialization as “the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors, and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies.”16  Gerald Epstein 
and Arjun Jayadev examined the rentier share of national income—that is, 
the rising profits of financial firms plus the interest income generated by 
nonfinancial firms and households—to describe the rise of the financial 
sector’s power in the economy.17  Other authors link financialization to 
broad macroeconomic trends of declining growth and compare the 
structural forces of financialization and neoliberalism.18 
Though corporations are currently driving economic inequality, it is 
important to remember that corporations can, in theory, be creators of 
economic prosperity.  William Lazonick outlines the “theory of innovative 
enterprise,” in which innovation drives the creation of higher-quality 
products at lower unit costs, benefitting consumers.19  Innovation stems 
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 15.   Id. 
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Inst., Working Paper No. 394, 2015), https://www.peri.umass.edu/publication/item/684-
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in the U.S. has been the increase in the volume of debt.”  Id.  Palley argues further that financialization 
is a particular form of neoliberalism.  Id. at 24.  “That means neoliberalism is the driving force behind 
financialization and the latter cannot be understood without an understanding of the former.”  THOMAS 
I. PALLEY, FINANCIALIZATION: THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE CAPITAL DOMINATION 1 (2013). 
 19.   William Lazonick, The Theory of Innovative Enterprise: A Foundation of Economic 
Analysis 4–16 (The Acad. Indus. Res. Network, Working Paper No. 13-0201, 2013), 
http://www.theairnet.org/v3/backbone/uploads/2015/08/Lazonick.TIE-Foundations_AIR-
WP13.0201.pdf.  Lazonick defines innovation as the generation of higher-quality and/or lower-cost 
products at prevailing input costs, which increases per capital output.  See id.  However, since 
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from a “retain-and-reinvest” model of corporate resource allocation, in 
which corporations retain profit and crucially invest in the productivity of 
workers by paying stable wages and rewarding skill growth and longevity 
in order to increase the innovation that they, the corporations, are able to 
produce and thus the profits they are able to earn.20  It is due to a reliance 
on profits earned from improving productivity that workers are able to 
bargain for an increased share of profits in the form of higher wages and 
benefits.21  As will be explored below, America’s firms have moved to the 
other end of the spectrum from this idealized version of corporate purpose, 
making it essential to reverse the incentives that drive corporate behavior. 
II. THE DECLINE OF THE INNOVATION-FOCUSED PUBLIC CORPORATION   
The postwar era saw the rise of the corporation and the linkage of 
stable corporate employment with basic family needs such as a stable 
income, health care, and retirement (though the availability of such 
employment was deeply stratified by race and gender).22  Firms depended 
on a steady workforce, and unions were able to make significant gains for 
their members, while hired managers came to wield significant authority 
over the decisions of the firms that employed them.23  Starting in the 
1980s, there have been significant shifts in the structure of large 
corporations and a concurrent long-term decline in employment security 
for workers.24  Though there are exceptions, the major transition that took 
place in the 1980s was from a corporate model in which success ultimately 
rested on the growth of sales to one in which maximizing returns for 
shareholders was the focus.25 
Beginning in the late twentieth century, workers became the largest 
cost to cut in pursuit of strong capital market valuation.26  Gerald Davis 
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(describing, in full, the shifts in public corporations over the last hundred years).  
 23.   Id. at 22–23, 39, 41–42. 
 24.   Id. at 53, 57–67. 
 25.   Id. at 59–61. 
 26.   See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 10–12 (2014). 
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describes how highly conglomerated firms that had been undervalued by 
the stock market were broken up through a wave of hostile takeovers in 
the 1980s.27  As firms became more responsive to capital market pressures 
and takeover threats, the labor accords of the postwar era became subject 
to rising cost scrutiny.28  By the 1990s, maximizing shareholder value had 
become the dominant mode for public corporations, driven by legal and 
regulatory shifts under the Reagan administration.29  Leading firms (e.g. 
Nike) focused on brand value over production and spun off to global 
suppliers, enabled by the rise of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs).30  Large-scale layoffs and rising benefits insecurity 
ensued—American mainstays like Sara Lee went from 154,000 to 10,000 
employees in ten years, and the computer and electronics industry as a 
whole lost 750,000 jobs.31  Since creating shareholder value was at odds 
with long-term, well-paid employment, employee cost-cutting became the 
norm and the labor market as a whole was destabilized.32 
David Weil documents a substantially similar process by focusing on 
the fissured workplace.33  He shows that as large corporations increasingly 
focused on core competencies in response to investor pressure to raise 
share prices, they moved a percentage of their workforce out of direct 
employment through subcontracting, outsourcing, or franchising.34  
Nonprofessional workers were no longer considered central to firm 
productivity—rather, firm profit required keeping overall labor costs as 
cheap as possible and getting rid of all the ancillary costs of direct 
employment.35  Pressure from the financial markets caused companies to 
shed increasing numbers of noncore employees.36  This reduced the ability 
of workers to claim a share of any increased profit made by leading firms.37  
Fundamentally, labor was shifted from “a wage setting problem into a 
contracting decision.”38 
                                                          
 27.   VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION, supra note 22, at 57–59. 
 28.   Id. at 59–61, 115. 
 29.   Id. at 60. 
 30.   Id. at 72. 
 31.   Id. at 76–77. 
 32.   Id. at 78–79. 
 33.   See WEIL, supra note 26.  
 34.   Id. at 95. 
 35.   Id. at 15. 
 36.   Id. at 73. 
 37.   Id. at 281. 
 38.   For a full discussion of the shifts in lead firm employment, see generally id. 
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III. THE RISE OF CORPORATE FINANCIALIZATION 
The changes in corporate behavior have led to an emphasis within 
firms on financial assets and shareholder value.  These shifts have 
happened within the context of rising corporate profits and stagnant wages.  
To analyze the impact of this shift on employees specifically, it is 
important to first measure increasing corporate financialization directly.  
Two types of measurements are important: first, the proportional rise of 
financial assets and income earned off of such assets, relative to profit 
earned from selling goods and services; second, the relative proportion of 
overall firm profit flowing to payouts to shareholders. 
Peter Chen, Loukas Karabarbounis, and Brent Neiman document two 
key shifts in global corporate behavior that show the rise of corporate 
financialization across industries and countries.39  First, corporate savings 
rose as a proportion of global savings, driven by increasing corporate 
profits;40 such savings become, in a macroeconomic sense, the funds 
available for the rest of the economy to borrow, and corporations are now 
net lenders to the rest of the economy.41  Corporate profits are allocated to 
payments to labor, capital, taxes, and savings, so, since labor’s share 
declined and taxes and dividends remained steady, corporate savings 
ineluctably rose.42  Second, they show how firms use this increase in 
savings, the options being to reinvest savings in productive investment or 
accumulate cash or other financial assets (one of the first indicators of 
increased financialization), repay debt, or increase share repurchases (the 
second major indicator of increased financialization).43  They document 
that productive investment did not keep pace with rising corporate savings 
and that all of the other uses of increased savings grew.44  “Given that 
dividend payments and investment did not increase much as a share of 
value added [profits], firms used part of the increased flow of savings to 
repurchase their shares and part of it to accumulate cash and other types 
of financial assets.”45 
In the rest of this section, I discuss the literature that focus the analysis 
on the United States. 
                                                          
 39.   See generally Chen, Karabarbounis & Neiman, supra note 5. 
 40.   Id. at 2.  Elsewhere in their analysis, the authors discuss the drivers of increased corporate 
profits: a declining real interest rate, the price of investment goods, and declining corporate taxes.  Id. 
at 14.  They do not discuss declining bargaining power of labor. 
 41.   Id. at 2. 
 42.   Id. at 12–14. 
 43.   Id. 
 44.   Id. 
 45.   Id. at 18. 
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A. Rising Financial Income within Nonfinancial Corporations 
The first way to measure corporate financialization is to look at the 
increase in income that firms make from financial assets and rising 
financial asset-holding. Greta Krippner presents evidence for a shifting 
“pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production. . . 
‘[f]inancial’ here refers to activities relating to the provision (or transfer) 
of liquid capital in expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital 
gains.”46  In other words, the “lens” she uses to analyze changes in 
American business looks at how profits are generated, rather than how 
employment has changed or the type of output has shifted.47 
In her study, Krippner measured the increasing ratio of portfolio 
income—income earned off of financial assets—to revenue from 
productive activities, looking at the total earnings accruing to NFCs from 
interest,48 dividends, and realized capital gains on financial investments, 
and measuring revenue using corporate cash flow (profits plus 
depreciation allowances).49  She finds that the ratio began to climb in the 
1970s and peaked in the 1980s at a level that was five times the ratio typical 
in the preceding decades.50  Notably, in the 1970s it was manufacturing 
firms that led the shift to relying on an increasing share of profit from 
financial activity.51  Krippner also found that a rise in interest income 
largely drove the surge in portfolio income, while capital gains and 
dividends held steady, demonstrating that a growing stock market cannot 
fully explain NFC financialization.52 
Ken-Hou Lin’s study shows how firms shifted into holding a rising 
proportion of financial assets.53  Specifically, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
ownership of financial assets varied with the business cycle, but since the 
                                                          
 46.   Krippner, supra note 7, at 174–75 (internal citations omitted). 
 47.   Krippner characterizes this as an activity-centric (versus an accumulation-centric) view of 
the economy.  Id.  She compares the “pictures” of the economy that emerge from the different 
viewpoints, showing that examining shifts in employment and output do not properly reveal the rise 
of financial income within “real economy” firms.  Id. 
 48.   This is the use of corporate cash in the financial sector, loaning it out as commercial paper 
to earn a return. 
 49.   Krippner, supra note 7, at 182–86. 
 50.   Id. at 184. 
 51.   Lin & Tomaskovic-Devey, supra note 7, at 1286.  
 52.   Krippner, supra note 7, at 186. 
 53.   See generally Ken-Hou Lin, The Rise of Finance and Firm Employment Dynamics, 27 ORG. 
SCI. 972 (2017) (discussing the institutional changes leading to firms holding a rising share of financial 
assets). 
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2000s there has been a steady rise in such ownership.54  This ownership is 
highly concentrated in large firms: Just thirty United States companies 
have together amassed holdings of more than $1.2 trillion worth of cash, 
securities, and financial investments.55  Roughly 70% are held overseas—
crucially, financial investment can be conducted without bringing the 
profit “home” to the United States, whereas productive investments 
require such repatriation and payment of United States corporate taxes.56 
Greta Krippner posits that rising financial asset-holding was initially 
driven by the high-interest-rate environment of the 1980s, when it was a 
bad time to be a borrower and a good time to be a lender.57  Corporate cash 
was directed toward higher-yield short-term financial assets rather than 
borrowing for investment purposes at extraordinarily high interest rates.58  
As will be explored in the next section, the push to increase short-term 
returns rose with the threat of takeovers driven by newly emboldened 
activist investors.59 In the current era, as interest rates have stayed 
historically low, for large firms at least, financial asset ownership may still 
provide a higher return in the short term than putting corporate cash to 
work where the gains require a long-term focus.60  The challenge is to 
reorient public policy so that it rewards investment in long-term, 
sustainable productivity, rather than incentivizing short-term gains from 
financial asset-holding. 
United States corporate tax policy has also driven the rise of financial 
asset-holding.  Prior to the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, firms 
holding cash overseas to avoid United States corporate tax rates could not 
repatriate the cash to invest in capital assets or employees in the United 
States, but they could use the cash to buy financial assets that they then 
continue to hold on the books of subsidiaries abroad.61  Until 2018, the 
United States corporate tax rate was relatively high, but the tax raised less 
revenue as a share of national income than comparable taxes did in other 
advanced economies.62  The United States corporate tax code did not, until 
                                                          
 54.   Id. at 974. 
 55.   Largest Debt Collectors, supra note 9.  
 56.   See Eric Platt, Nicole Bullock, & Alexandra Scaggs, U.S. Companies Transformed into 
800lb Gorilla in Bond Market, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/46027dd2-
8f6c-11e7-9084-d0c17942ba93. 
 57.    Krippner, supra note 7, at 186. 
 58.   Id. at 183. 
 59.   See infra Section II.B. 
 60.   Largest Debt Collectors, supra note 9. 
 61.   Id.  
 62.   See KIMBERLY A. CLAUSING, STRENGTHENING THE INDISPENSABLE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 
6, 8, 11, 28 (Wash Ctr. for Equitable Growth, 2016). 
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the recent passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017,63 tax foreign income 
until it was repatriated, decreasing the incentive to invest in the United 
States and making more attractive the incentive to invest in financial assets 
with otherwise-idle cash stashed abroad.64 
How debt is treated in corporate tax policy has also driven the rise of 
corporate financialization.  Financial and nonfinancial corporations have 
a tax-driven incentive to fund operations through debt rather than equity, 
which decreases their ability to sustainably absorb losses.65  Firms are able 
to take a tax deduction for interest payments on their debt but not for the 
returns they pay out on equity, namely dividend and capital gains 
payments to shareholders.66  The fact that payments on equity cannot be 
deducted when computing corporate taxable income, but interest 
payments on debt can, leads to an overuse of leverage by firms.67  This 
pro-debt bias affects nonfinancial and financial corporations, but the 
cumulative impact of increased leverage is more significant in the 
financial sector.68  During the financial crisis, firms were vastly indebted—
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns had less than 4% of their value in 
equity69—and took on additional risk by using instruments like hybrid 
securities, which counted as debt for tax purposes but were considered 
equity for regulatory purposes.70 
B. The Shift to Shareholder Value Maximization 
A robust literature71 documents the second strand of corporate 
financialization: the dominant ideology of shareholder value 
maximization and related shifts in executive pay.  As firms were driven by 
pressure from shareholders to maximize profits and share value in order to 
fund higher dividends and returns from selling shares, rising share price 
                                                          
 63.   Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 64.   CLAUSING, supra note 62, at 8, 29.  
 65.   Robert C. Pozen & Lucas W. Goodman, Capping the Deductibility of Corporate Interest 
Expense, 137 TAX NOTES 1207, 1222 (2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2013/01/Capping-the-Deductibility-of-Corporate-Interest-Expense.pdf. 
 66.   Id.   
 67.   Id.  
 68.   Mark J. Roe & Michael Tröge, Taxing Banks Properly: The Next Regulatory Frontier 3 
(2016), web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economics-studies/taxingbanksprop 
erly_feb_20_2016_v5.2.pdf. 
 69.   Id. at 6. 
 70.   Id.  
 71.   A review of the literature documenting this rise is beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., 
Profits Without Prosperity, supra note 8; VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION, supra note 22; and 
WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 13. 
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became the core concern of firm management, which moved away from 
the previous era of “managerial capitalism.”72  Under managerial 
capitalism, directors saw themselves as responsible for a broader set of 
stakeholders, including but not limited to shareholders.73 Share price was 
one core metric, but revenue and profit, market share, and long-term 
investments also mattered to firm performance.  The rise of institutional 
investors and ownership by large financial institutions, such as private 
equity funds, drove the transition away from long-term stock holding and 
toward short-term stock trading.  This focus on short-term outcomes 
distinguishes shareholders from sharesellers, as the focus on short-term 
gain hurts the very kinds of productive investment that can provide for 
longer-term sustainable growth of firm output. 74 
The shareholder primacy model taught that corporate executives 
served as agents of the corporate owners—shareholders—and executives 
should therefore maximize value for shareholders, focusing on the key 
metric of the share price.75  This thinking led to “dramatic shifts in U.S. 
corporate law and practice,” in the form of changes to corporate 
governance rules, executive compensation norms—principally the rise of 
stock-based pay—and federal securities laws.76  The ascendance of the 
ideology can be traced to Milton Friedman’s 1970 essay in the New York 
Times arguing for shareholder primacy.77  The article was followed up by 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 1976 “Theory of the Firm,” 
which started from an assumption that shareholders own corporations and 
therefore are entitled to residual profits.78  Shareholder primacy succeeded 
in part because corporate executives became shareholders through the 
increasingly popular practice of paying executives through shares and 
                                                          
 72.   See generally WARTZMAN, supra note 21.  
 73.   Id.  
 74.   William Lazonick, Matt Hopkins & Ken Jacobson, The Burger Buyback King: McDonald’s 
Stock-Price Manipulation Makes Most Americans Worse Off 4 (The Acad. Indus. Res. Network, 
Working Paper No. 15-05/01, 2015) [hereinafter Burger Buyback] http://www.theairnet.org/v3/ 
backbone/uploads/2015/05/Lazonick.Hopkins.Jacobson_Burger.Buyback.King_AIR-
WP15.0501.pdf. 
 75.   Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth 4 (Cornell Law Faculty Publ’n No. 771, 2013), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2311&context=facpub. (discussing the 
rise of the ideology of shareholder primacy and its critical flaws as a matter of law). 
 76.   Id. at 1. 
 77.   See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1970/09/13/223535562.pdf. 
 78.   Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs And Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976).  
 
1022 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
because of the loophole that allowed stock-based pay to continue to be 
deducted by corporations even when it was over $1 million.79 
Lynn Stout in The Shareholder Value Myth questions whether 
shareholder primacy has any basis in United States corporate law.80  She 
distinguishes the idea that shareholders “own” corporations from the legal 
construct that corporations in fact own themselves, while what 
shareholders own are shares in the legal entity known as the corporation 
that give shareholders limited legal rights.  Further, “in this regard, 
shareholders stand on equal footing with the corporation’s bondholders, 
suppliers, and employees, all of whom also enter contracts with the firm 
that give them limited legal rights.”81  Another version of shareholder 
primacy says that shareholders are the “residual claimants” of the firm’s 
profits, other stakeholders having fixed contractual claims.82  Stout shows 
that this claim only holds when firms are in bankruptcy, since otherwise 
corporations are in fact their own residual claimant, entitled to keep their 
profits for use at directors’ discretion.83  However, despite the legal issues 
with the shareholder primacy argument, it remains the dominant model in 
corporate practice.84 
C. The Rise of Stock Buybacks 
The rise of shareholder primacy has caused exponential growth in the 
corporate practice of buying back shares of their own stock on the open 
market, increasing their share price (as fewer shares remain) without 
improving their product or finding new customers.85  This has the direct 
consequence of reducing the earnings that are retained within the firm.  
Before the 1970s, American corporations paid out 50% of profits to 
shareholders and retained the rest for investment.86  Now, shareholder 
payments are 90% of reported profits.87  Buybacks are a speculative 
                                                          
 79.   Jena McGregor, This Tax Loophole Led to Massive CEO Pay Packages. Why Eliminating it 
isn’t Likely to Rein Them in, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/on-leadership/wp/2017/11/22/this-tax-loophole-led-to-massive-ceo-pay-packages-why-
eliminating-it-isnt-likely-to-rein-them-in/?utm_term=.46bce4eab345.  Corporate tax law otherwise 
does not allow for corporations to deduct executive pay over $1 million; the “performance-based 
loophole” was in existence until the 2018 tax law reforms.  Id. 
 80.   See generally Stout, supra note 75.  
 81.   Id. at 4.  
 82.   Id. at 3. 
 83.   Id.  
 84.   Id. at 2. 
 85.   Profits Without Prosperity, supra note 8, at 2.  
 86.   MASON, supra note 1.  
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mechanism that do not provide new productive capital to firms; instead, 
they raise share prices directly, rewarding the selling of stock.  From 2003 
to 2012, the firms that make up the S&P 500 spent 54% of net income on 
buybacks ($2.4 trillion).88  This directly benefits the shareholders who sell 
stock at the higher prices, and corporate executives whose pay is largely 
stock-based.89  This activity is largely confined to the largest American 
firms, and examples from among America’s top name brands abound.  
Investigating McDonald’s, a study by William Lazonick, Matt Hopkins, 
and Ken Jacobson shows how the iconic American firm expended $29.4 
billion on buybacks from 2005 to 2014, which equated to 67% of net 
income.90  McDonald’s, like many firms, conducts buybacks even when 
the stock price is relatively high, which is a further waste of corporate 
cash.91  In 2017, Walmart announced a new $20 billion stock buyback 
program, following years of billion-dollar buyback investments, even as 
its share price was up 17% last year.92  In the words of William Lazonick, 
as firms shifted to “favoring value extraction over value creation, this 
approach has contributed to employment instability and income 
inequality.”93 
Regulatory shifts have also contributed to the rise in stock buybacks.  
Stock buybacks opened up companies to liability for insider trading by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) until 1982, when adoption of 
a “safe harbor” rule protected the practice from accusations of stock-price 
manipulation by the SEC as long as companies followed a set of basic 
rules governing timing and volume.  Before the safe harbor was instituted, 
buybacks were near zero.  According to William Lazonick, 
Consider the 449 companies in the S&P 500 index that were publicly 
listed from 2003 through 2012.  During that period those companies used 
54% of their earnings—a total of $2.4 trillion—to buy back their own 
stock, almost all through purchases on the open market.  Dividends 
absorbed an additional 37% of their earnings.  That left very little for 
investments in productive capabilities or higher incomes for 
employees.94 
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Companies repurchase shares in order to drive up earnings per share 
(EPS) by reducing the total shares on the market.95  The practice is seen as 
a more tax-efficient way to return capital to shareholders than declaring 
dividends.96 
Section 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange 
Act”) prohibit such fraudulent and manipulative practices in connection 
with an issuer’s (or “affiliated purchaser’s”) purchase of the issuer’s own 
securities.97  Rule 10b-18 allowed companies to put in place stock buyback 
programs98 and carry them out after approval by the board of directors, and 
set up a non-exclusive safe harbor against allegations of market 
manipulation under Section 9(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5 solely by reason of the 
manner, timing, price, and volume of the repurchases.99  In order to qualify 
for the safe harbor, the repurchase program, whether conducted directly 
by the company or by a broker-dealer, must meet all of the conditions 
outlined in the rule concerning the manner of purchase, timing of the 
purchase, volume level, and price.100  The safe harbor conditions apply 
daily, and a failure to meet any one of the four conditions eliminates the 
safe harbor for all purchases made that day.101  However, since disclosure 
is only made quarterly, in practice, unless purchases for the quarter totaled 
more than the aggregate of the allowed daily amount for the time period, 
there is no way for the SEC to determine whether the safe harbor rules 
have been violated. 
Share repurchase programs should be disclosed before they are 
commenced, though no set disclosure period is required.  Disclosure plans 
                                                          
 95.   Id. 
 96.   Id. 
 97.   Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2012). 
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240.10b-18, 240.13e-3, 240-13e4.  The safe harbor also does not apply to purchases other than 
common stock (or an equivalent interest) or purchases made outside of the United States.  See id. 
 100.   Id. § 240.10b-18(b)(1)–(4).  
 101.   Id.  
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must include the time period for the program, the maximum number of 
shares proposed to be acquired or the maximum amount of funds to be 
expended, the objective of the acquisition of shares, any plan or proposal 
relating to the disposition of shares to be purchased, and any indication of 
how the purchase will be made.102  Disclosure can be made through a Form 
10-Q,103 Form 10-K;104 press release, or Form 8-K.105  Disclosure of all 
issuer repurchases (regardless of whether they fall under the safe harbor) 
is required in quarterly reports under Regulations S-K106 and S-B under 
the Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940,107 though the 
reporting is done per month, whether they are conducted through open-
market purchases or private transactions.108  Companies report the total 
number of shares purchased, the price per share, and the proportion of the 
previously announced buyback program that has been accomplished at the 
time of the report.109 
IV. FINANCIALIZATION AND LABOR MARKETS 
In the era of increased financialization, the ability of workers to 
bargain for a greater share of firm profits has eroded.  The increased 
pressure from financial markets to keep share prices high and avoid hostile 
takeovers resulted in the top job of corporate executives shifting from 
managing rising sales to managing rising share price.  This led not only to 
pressure to keep wages from rising, but to a fissured workplace as 
executives pushed to locate increasing proportions of nonprofessional 
workers outside the firm, whether through subcontracting or 
outsourcing.110  In other words, there is simply less availability for 
employee compensation, as profit must flow out to shareholders and 
creditors.  This has long-term consequences for companies, as it 
                                                          
 102.   See id. § 229.703; see also Form N-CSR, SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
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 110.   See generally WEIL, supra note 26; VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION, supra note 22. 
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potentially leads to declines in skill level and difficulties in improving the 
productivity of labor, especially when greater fissuring of the workplace 
occurs.  The increasing share of profit earned off of financial assets also 
means that workers may be needed less, as firms make money off of 
financial activity rather than their traditional function.  Finally, because 
executives have been transformed into shareholders themselves, their 
incentive to prioritize share price over productivity growth is personal.  
While companies may claim that increased compensation for employees 
is out of reach, the large-scale use of corporate profits for financial 
purposes debunks that claim. 
Several authors look at the correlation between rising buybacks and 
declining wages, showing that corporate funds going to buybacks could be 
redeployed to raise wages.111  The scale is startling: As Catherine 
Ruetschlin and Amy Traub show, rather than spending $6.6 billion on 
stock buybacks in 2013, Walmart could have raised the wages of its 
825,000 frontline employees by $5.13 per hour if it had chosen to invest 
in its workers.112  William Lazonick shows that while McDonald’s 
conducted the buyback program described above, it paid the 90,000 US 
workers that it directly employs one dollar over the legal minimum wage, 
bringing the average wage to $9.90 per hour.113 
Ken-Hou Lin documents how the rise in financial asset-holding, the 
substitution of corporate debt for equity, and shareholder value orientation 
impacts employment size, and specifically considers the disparate effects 
among different occupational groups: production employees, service 
employees, and professional and management employees.114  He finds that 
the increase in financial assets leads to a long-run significant decline in the 
blue-collar production workforce (whereas there is a positive effect on 
managerial, professional, and service employment).115  Lin also studies 
how the increased dependence on debt and its substitution for equity 
generates a rising pressure to pay interest before workers’ claims can be 
considered; this behavior also amplifies the need to reduce the workforce 
during downturns, when creditors still need to be paid.116  His empirical 
                                                          
 111.   See generally Burger Buyback, supra note 74; Catherine Ruetschlin & Amy Traub, A Higher 
Wage Is Possible at Walmart, DĒMOS 2 (2014), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
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benefit from reallocating resources to human capital management. . . .”). 
 112.   Ruetschlin & Traub, supra note 112, at 2. 
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 115.   Id. at 981–83. 
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investigation shows that both rising debt and rising returns to shareholders 
have long-run negative effects on all occupational types.117  Interestingly, 
the debt ratio has a weaker impact on service employment than on the blue-
collar production workforce, whereas the negative effect of shareholder 
rewards is strongest vis-à-vis service employment.118  Lin also finds that 
the financialization trends themselves, and their impact on employment 
size, rose throughout the last few decades.119 
Ken-Hou Lin and Donald Tomaskovic-Devey investigate the impact 
of rising corporate financialization and income inequality, finding that 
increased earnings from financial activity is associated with a falling labor 
share, increased compensation of top executives, and increased earnings 
dispersion among workers. 120  They find that: 
[T]he financialization of the U.S. economy restructured social relations 
and income dynamics in the rest of the economy.  We believe that firms’ 
increasing reliance on financial, rather than production, income 
decoupled the generation of surplus from production and sales, 
strengthening owners’ and elite workers’ negotiating power against other 
workers.  The result was an incremental exclusion of the general 
workforce from revenue-generating and compensation-setting 
processes.121 
Notably, their research shows that financialization had an impact on 
labor outcomes comparable with the more common explanations for 
increased income inequality, including globalization, technological 
change, capital investment, and declining rates of unionization.122  Their 
study also conducted a counterfactual analysis, fixing the level of 
corporate financialization at its 1970 level and examining the difference 
between the observed and counterfactual trend.123  The contrast shows that 
financialization accounted for approximately 58% of the decline in labor’s 
share of profits between 1970 and 2008.124  The counterfactual analysis 
shows a lesser but still positive impact on the growth of officers’ share of 
compensation (9.6%) and growth in earnings dispersion between 1970 and 
2008 (10.2%).125 
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Petra Dünhaupt also examines the effect of both strands of corporate 
financialization on labor’s share of income, measuring the “distributional 
conflict” between firms and shareholders on the one hand and wage and 
salary earners on the other.126  She uses net interest and dividend payments 
as a share of the capital stock of the business sector as the proxy for 
financialization and finds a positive relationship between the increase of 
such payments and the decline of the share of national income that goes to 
wages.127  Rising shareholder value orientation is measured as increased 
net interest and net dividend payments as a share of the capital stock of the 
business sector.128  She examines results for thirteen countries from 1986 
to 2007 and finds that the share of retained profits declined along with the 
labor share, while dividend and interest payments were rising—pointing 
to increased corporate financialization as a causal factor in the decline of 
the labor share.129   
V. CORPORATE FINANCIALIZATION AND PRODUCTIVE INVESTMENT 
Rising corporate financialization has not only weakened the labor 
market, it has also left less firm profit available for productive investment.  
In an important pair of papers, Germán Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon 
document how declining investment relative to profit began in the 
2000s,130 largely explained by increasing market power131 and common 
ownership within industries.  Firms also exhibit a disproportionate amount 
of short-termism and tightened corporate governance.132  Specifically, they 
find that firms that invest less, despite high profits, spend a 
                                                          
 126.   Petra Dünhaupt, The Effect of Financialization on Labor’s Share of Income 1 (Inst. for Int’l 
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disproportionate amount of available cash flow on stock repurchases.133  
Investment has not fallen because profit has fallen; they show that the 
average ratio of net investment to net operating surplus has fallen from an 
average of 20% between 1959 and 2001 to 10% between 2002 and 2015.134  
In other words, despite available cash, “industries with less competition 
invest . . . less,”135 while governance prioritizes buybacks over productive 
investment.  Gutierrez and Philippon also examined other common 
explanations for low investment, but found those based on financial 
frictions and globalization to be less persuasive.136 
J.W. Mason also provides evidence of the break in the link between 
corporate cash flow and borrowing and productive investment, showing 
that since the 1980s, firms largely “borrow to enrich their investors in the 
short-run.”137  This phenomenon reached its zenith in mid-2007, just 
before the financial crisis, when aggregate payouts actually exceeded 
aggregate investment.138  Mason shows a dramatic shift over time: “In the 
1960s and 1970s, an additional dollar of earnings or borrowing was 
associated with about a forty-cent increase in investment.”139  This ratio 
has been less than ten cents of each borrowed dollar since the 1980s.140  At 
the same time, shareholder payouts nearly doubled.141  Mason shows that 
“the net flow of funds from financial markets to the corporate sector” did 
not shift before and after the Great Recession, and the decline in 
investment cannot be explained by tightening credit conditions.142  As he 
explains, “finance is no longer an instrument for getting money into 
productive businesses, but instead for getting money out of them.”143 
Demonstrating the importance of productive investment in one critical 
industry, William Lazonick, Matt Hopkins, and Ken Jacobson examine the 
financialization of the pharmaceutical industry, concluding that increased 
financialization means that profits are not invested in potentially lifesaving 
                                                          
 133.   Id. at 4. 
 134.   Investment-less Growth, supra note 1, at 8–9.  
 135.   Declining Competition and Investment, supra note 130, at 1. 
 136.   Id. 
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innovations in new drugs.144  Firms in the pharmaceutical sector allocate a 
disproportionate share of profits to share repurchase programs, enriching 
top executives along the way, while arguing against price regulation in the 
name of retaining high levels of profits to invest in innovation.145  They 
found that the eighteen drug companies in the S&P 500 Index distributed 
99% of profits to shareholders from 2006 to 2015, distributed as 50% 
buybacks and 49% dividends.146  This translates to $261 billion spent on 
buybacks over the decades, unevenly divided among the eighteen firms.147  
Meanwhile, investment in R&D was only 16% of total revenue.148 
Leila Davis conducted a firm-level analysis of the constraint on fixed 
investment from increased flows to the financial sector.149  She defines 
financialization as an “increasingly complex” relationship between NFCs 
and the financial sector;150 and she shows the rise of financialization 
through the increasing share of financial assets relative to both sales and 
shifts in external financing (increasing indebtedness), especially for large 
firms, which leads to declining investment.151  Specifically, she shows that 
for large firms, total financial assets increased from 29.8% of sales in 1971 
to 47.2% in 2011, while fixed capital declined from 52.4% to 43.9% of 
sales.152  Her firm-level data set allows for a more specific demonstration 
of the shifting asset mix by disaggregating different assets and separating 
cash and short-term investments, current receivables, advances, and 
“other” financial assets.153  This shows that liquid capital increased 4.2% 
for large firms, while “other” capital increased 8.6%.154  She suggests that 
the move into “other” financial assets held by large NFCs may reveal a 
shift into providing financial services, such as car loans or store credit 
cards.155 
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Davis posits that it is critical to examine the purpose of increased 
financial profits in order to more fully understand the impact on fixed 
investment.156  Investment decisions rely on the value of fixed investment 
as well as decisions on how to finance investments; both have shifted in 
the last several decades due to new norms of corporate governance and 
rising firm-level volatility.157  She finds that rising shareholder value 
maximization is associated with declining fixed investment in large firms 
as the pressure of short-termism drives reallocation.158  For the largest 
firms, a 1-standard-deviation increase in average industry-level 
repurchases is associated with a .14-standard-deviation decline in 
investment.159  In contrast, she finds that “the stock of financial assets is 
found to have a positive and robust relationship to fixed investment in both 
the short-term and the long-run in most specifications.”160  This is 
consistent with her explanation that “for given expected returns, firms hold 
both fixed and financial assets, and investment actually increases if the 
stock of financial assets rises above the desired level.”161  Especially for 
large firms, the financial profit rate is positively correlated with 
investment, suggesting “large firms generate complementarities between 
financial profits and the nonfinancial components of their business that are 
not captured by smaller firms.”162  This movement into rising investment 
as the profit rate rises shows how certain types of rising financial assets 
can increase demand for the firm’s nonfinancial profits, thereby 
supporting, rather than hindering, fixed investment. 
Additional studies also examine the relationship between financial 
profit and investment.  Özgür Orhangazi outlines a model specifying two 
flows of financialization—income earned off of investment in financial 
assets and financial payouts—and examines each with respect to corporate 
investment.163  He tests the two effects on a large sample of firms over the 
three decades from 1973 to 2003.164  He finds, as above, that increased 
financial profit opportunities crowd out productive investment as 
managers chase higher short-term returns, and that increased payments to 
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shareholders decrease available internal funds, while also increasing 
uncertainty.165  Like Davis, Orhangazi finds that the negative effects from 
increased financial profits is mainly felt by large corporations.166 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the financialization of the corporate sector continues, it is critical 
to understand that none of these shifts are inevitable: all result from policy 
choices that create incentives and opportunities for firms to increasingly 
act as financial actors.  Therefore, along with implementing policies that 
raise the minimum wage through legislation and improve the bargaining 
power of wage-earners through unionization, it is critical to rewrite tax, 
corporate governance, and other public policies that have driven firms to 
financialize.  America’s working families, and future prosperity, depend 
on this reorientation. 
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